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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING: COMMITMENTS TO EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC FUNDS IN ADVANCE OF, OR INDEPENDENTLY OF, THEIR APPROPRIATION BY PARLIAMENT: AUDIT COMMENT

WHY THIS MATTER IS IMPORTANT

The Executive Government has the authority to enter into contracts for the purpose of the business and affairs of government. This is a prerogative authority recognised by the common law as vested in the Crown. As a common law prerogative power of the Crown it stands until such time as it may be altered by statute.

In general terms, whilst certain procedural and other requirements have been imposed by statutes or statutory instruments59, the common law authority of the Crown to contract for the purposes of government has not been abrogated by statute in South Australia. As already mentioned60, what has changed is the fact that some government service contracts are now of a duration, materiality, and type, that reflect a new pattern of public administrative arrangements for the delivery of those government services. The indications from the 1998-99 Budget papers are that this trend in administrative arrangements will continue.61

Under the existing legislative framework in this State, this new pattern of administrative arrangements in its practical application, has, in my opinion, the consequence of circumventing Parliamentary 'appropriation control' of Executive Government spending when the latter enters into major contractual obligations for the delivery of government services outside of the legislative processes of the Parliament.

BACKGROUND COMMENTS

In the introductory comments to this Part of the Report it was stated that long term contractual arrangements being entered into by the Government for the provision of services involve a commitment to pay public funds, in advance of, or independently of, their appropriation by the Parliament62. Whilst this is characteristic of government contracting generally, for the reasons discussed in this Report, the audit, legal, and governmental incidents associated with several major service contracts now in place for the delivery of government services distinguish present arrangements in these matters from past practice63.

The legality of these arrangements is not in question. It is settled law that the validity of a government contract does not depend on there being an appropriation for that contract64. Apart from the matter of legality, for the reasons discussed in this section of the Report, there are certain matters related to contractual arrangements and Parliamentary appropriations that, in my opinion, are important to draw to the attention of the Government and the Parliament in accordance with subsection36(1)(b) of the Public Finance and Audit Act1987.

The process of Parliamentary appropriation is an important control associated with the expenditure of public monies. Where this process does not operate in accordance with the established estimates and legislative supply/appropriation processes, there is a consequence for the discharge of the audit mandate under the Public Finance and Audit Act1987. This consequence, simply stated, is that in the absence of such processes, there is an increased audit risk and additional compensating substantive audit procedures must be planned and executed. There may also, as discussed in another section of this Report65 be a practical fetter on the Executive flexibility of the current and successor governments.

SOME RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

The authority to issue or apply money from the Consolidated Account in South Australia is controlled by the Public Finance and Audit Act 1987. Section 6 of that Act provides as follows:

6. (1) Money must not be issued or applied from the Consolidated Account except under the authority of 

(a) this Act;
(b) an annual Appropriation Act;
(c) a Supply Act; or
(d) some other Act of Parliament.
(2) The Treasurer must, when issuing or applying money from the Consolidated Account, act in accordance with the Act by or under which the money has been appropriated.

The reference in paragraph (d) of subsection 6 (1) includes a reference to the Crown Proceedings Act 1992 the relevance of which is discussed hereunder.

The provisions of section 6 of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1987 reflect the long standing constitutional principle of Parliamentary control of the authority of the Executive Government to spend public monies. This principle was stated by the House of Lords in Auckland Harbour Board v The King (1924) AC 318 at 326 as follows:

No money can be taken out of a consolidated fund into which the revenues of the State have been paid, excepting under a distinct authorisation from Parliament itself. The days are long gone by in which the Crown, or its servants, apart from Parliament, could give such an authorisation or ratify an improper payment. Any payment out of the consolidated fund made without Parliamentary authority is simply illegal and ultra vires, and may be recovered by the Government if it can, · be traced.

The High Court in Brown v West (1990) 64 ALJR 204 at 208 stated as follows66:

Historically, the need of the Executive Government to seek annual appropriations of the Consolidated Revenue Fund 'for the service of the year' or 'in respect of the year' has been the means, and it remains one of the critical means, by which the Parliament retains an ultimate control over the public purse strings, but the Parliament foregoes its annual-exercised power over expenditure by government when a law containing a standing appropriation is enacted. Standing appropriations need not be included in annual appropriations.

The Crown Proceedings Act 1992 enacts a standing appropriation authority to pay monies in the case of a judgment against the Crown including a judgment under a contract.

A 'commitment' to future expenditure to meet a contractual obligation is not inconsistent with the requirements of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1987. A 'commitment' to pay money in the future does not amount to the 'issue' or 'application' of money out of the Consolidated Account. It does, however, give rise to a commitment to be met by the Crown in the future. As such, the liability must be disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statements67.

In the normal course of government contracting, as it has been undertaken in the past, Parliamentary appropriation control would not raise the issues being presented by present day contractual relationships. In my opinion, these relationships become a matter of importance for the Government and the Parliament in circumstances where the financial commitments are material in monetary terms and the obligations under long term service contracts relate to government functional responsibilities that have 'public interest elements' that go beyond the rights and obligations of the contracting parties68.

In my opinion, the circumvention of traditional Parliamentary appropriation processes arises as an issue of importance from the combination of the following:

The extended use of service contracts for the purpose of discharging governmental responsibilities, when combined with claims for confidentiality, in my opinion, marginalises the role of Parliament and Parliamentary control of Executive spending of public money70.

CROWN PROCEEDINGS ACT 1992

In South Australia, the Crown Proceedings Act 1992 specifically provides that where the Crown fails to meet its contractual obligations, it is open to the counterparty to the contract to obtain a judgment from the court with respect to that matter.

Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1992 provides as follows:

10. (1) No writ, warrant or similar process may be issued out of any court to enforce a judgment against the Crown.

(2) Where a final judgment is given against the Crown in right of this State or any other State, the court must transmit a copy of the judgment to the Governor of the relevant state.

(3) Where the Governor of this State receives a final judgment from a court of this or any other State, the Governor will give directions as to the manner in which the judgment is to be satisfied.

(4) Any Minister, agency or instrumentality of the State Crown to which a direction is given under subsection (3) is authorized and required to carry out the direction.

(5) A direction under this section is sufficient authority for the appropriation of money from the General Revenue of the State or from the funds of any agency or instrumentality of the Crown. [my emphasis]

It can be seen from the abovementioned provision in the Crown Proceedings Act 1992 that the direction of the Governor for the satisfaction of the judgment 'is sufficient authority for the appropriation of the money from the general revenue of the State ·'.

The substantive affect of section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1992, in light of the statutory and constitutional principles stated above, is that government contracts can be enforced and monies paid in relation to that contract, independently of the appropriation of funds by Parliament for the purpose of that contract.

AUDIT COMMENT

The extensive use of contract for the delivery of government services, when combined with claims for confidentiality, apart from significantly increasing the audit risk and the fetter consequence for present and successor governments, can also, for the reasons discussed herein, diminish the effectiveness of one of the foundations of responsible government, ie Parliamentary control of government spending.

As Professor T Daintith observed with respect to the British House of Commons regarding the use of contracts by the Executive Government to implement programs:

It would be sad, but not surprising, · if Parliament were to sit quietly by while Government fashioned for itself a new prerogative71.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the notes to the accounts of public authorities separately disclose amounts payable under material long term contractual arrangements where those contracts involve the delivery of services to either the community on behalf of the Government or to the government itself.

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59 See B Selway; 'The Constitution of South Australia' (1995) Federation Press Chapter 15. back

60 See the section 'Government Contracts: The Role and Responsibility of the Auditor-General under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1987. back

61 See 'Budget Statement, 1998-99 Budget Paper 2' at pp. 2-3 where it is stated as follows:

To meet the service delivery needs of the South Australian community to a standard and at levels of efficiency at least comparable with other States.

Sound fiscal management is not an end in itself. It is a necessary pre-condition to the sustainable provision of services to the community without the threat of increased deficits or taxation in the future.

The overriding objective of the Government is the provision of high quality services that give value for money and are responsive to community needs. The introduction of an explicit outcomes/outputs framework with this budget will create a more transparent, responsive and performance-oriented service delivery environment. The adoption of accrual output pricing will facilitate greater use of competition and benchmarking amongst service providers and more explicit contractual arrangements for purchasing outputs, be it from internal or external providers. [my emphasis] back

62 See the section 'Government Contracts: Introductory Comments'. back

63 The contracts referred to include Modbury Hospital, Data Processing by EDS and Water and Wastewater Management. back

64 New South Wales v Bardolph (1934) 52 CLR 455. back

65 See section 'Government Contracts: Fetters on the Future Exercise of Statutory and Prerogative Powers: Implications for Successor Governments: Crown Proceedings Act 1992: Audit Responsibilities'. back

66 The High Court in this case was dealing with the constitutional arrangements associated with the Commonwealth Parliament. The same principles apply in the case of the South Australian Parliament. See also Professor E Campbell; 'Parliamentary Appropriations' (1971) 4 Adel LR 145. back

67 There is not a uniform treatment of the identification of the commitments under specific contracts by public authorities. back

68 Contracts relating to Prison Management, Prisoner Escort and Public Health are, in my opinion, in this category. back

69 There have been previous attempts by governments in Australia to spend money without Parliamentary authority. See J Waugh 'Evading Parliamentary Control of Government Spending: Some Early Case Studies' (1998) 9 PLR 28. See also PA Howell 'The Flinders History of South Australia - Political History' (Ed D Jaensch) (1986) at p. 95. back

70 Whilst the tenor of the comment in this section of the Report concerns the relation of the Parliament and the Executive Government it is relevant to note an example of Executive Government frustration of being locked out of influence in decision making under a legislative arrangement that limited the State Government and the relevant State Minister. This example, is to be found in the second reading debate in the South Australian Parliament on the matter of the 'MFP Development (Winding Up) Amendment Bill' on 24 February 1998. At page 404 of the Hansard for the Legislative Council the Treasurer stated:

The current MFP legislation, agreed to with the Commonwealth and put in place by the former Federal and State Labor Governments, has given this State Government and the relevant Minister virtually no say in how funds were to be spent and staff resources deployed.

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71 See T Daintith, 'Regulation by Contract: The New Prerogative' (1979) Current Legal Problems 41 at p. 59. back